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ABSTRACT
Software safety issues become important when computers are
used to control real-time, safety-critical processes. This survey
attempts to explain why there is a problem, what the problem is,
and what is known about how to solve it. Since this is a relatively
new software research area, emphasis is placed on delineating the
outstanding issues and research areas.
[Note to readers: This technical report has been submitted for pub
lication to Computing Surveys. Comments on this manuscript are
welcomed.]
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Introduction
*
Digital computers are not inherently unsafe, and until recently they have
not been used to control potentially unsafe processes. But computers are increas
ingly being used to monitor and/or control complex, time-critical physical
processes or mechanical devices where a run-time error or failure could result in
death, injury, loss of property, or environmental harm. Examples can be found
in transportation, energy, aerospace, basic industry, medicine, and defense sys
tems.
A natural reluctance to introduce unknown and complex factors to these sys
tems has previously kept computers out of most safety-critical loops. However,
the potential advantages of using computers now often outweighs nervousness,
and digital computers are being given more and more control functions previously
performed only by human operators and/or proven analog methods. As just one
example, only 10% of our weapon systems required computer software in 1955,
while today the figure is over 80% [45,125]. Both computer scientists and system
engineers are finding themselves faced with difTicult and unsolved problems.
This paper presents some of these issues and problems along with a survey of
some currently suggested solutions. Unfortunately, there are more problems than
solutions. Most of the problems are not new, but are only of a greater magni
tude. Some techniques that have not been cost effective suddenly become more
viable. Some issues call for unique and original research and procedures.
r
The word "computer" is used in this paper to denote digital computers only.
Background (Is there a problem?)
There are a variety of reasons for introducing computers into safety critical
environments. Digital computers have the potential to provide increased versatil
ity and power, improved performance, greater efficiency, and decreased cost. It
has been suggested that introducing computers will also improve safety [122], but
there is some question about this. Safety-critical systems tend to have reliability
requirements ranging from 10"^ to 10'^ . For example, NASA has a requirement
of 10'^ chance of failure over a 10 hour flight [30]. British requirements for reac
tor safety systems include a requirement that no single fault shall cause a reactor
trip. There also must be a 10 average probability, over 5000 hours, of failure to
meet a demand to trip [141]. FAA rules require that any failure condition that
would be catastrophic is extremely improbable. The p. rase ^'extremely improb
able" is defined by the FAA as 10 ^ per hour or per fi .,nt, as appro iate, or in
words: "is not expected to occur within the total life span of the whole fleet of
the model " [137]. There is no way that these levels of reliability can be
guaranteed (or even measured) for software with the software engineering tech
niques existing today. In fact, it has been suggested that we are orders of magni
tude below these requirements [30]. When computers are used to replace elec
tromechanical devices that can achieve higher reliability levels, then safety may
not be improved.
Even in systems where computers can improve safety, it is not clear that the
end result is actually an increase in safety. For example, Perrow [110] argues
that although technological improvements reduce the possibility of aircraft
accidents substantially, they also enaole those making decisions to run greater
risks in search of increased performance. As the technology improves, the
increased safety potential is not fully realized because the demand for speed, fuel
economy, altitude, maneuverability, and all-weather operations increases.
But despite potential problems, computers are being introduced to control
some hazardous systems. There are just too many good reasons for using them
and too few practical alternatives. Decisions will have to be made about where
the use of computers provides more potential improvements than problems, i.e.,
computer use will need to be evaluated in terms of benefits and risks. There have
been suggestions that certain types of systems provide too much risk to justify
their existence (or to justify using computers to control them) [14,110]. More
information is needed in order to make these decisions.
One important trend is the building of systems where manual intervention is
no longer a feasible backup measure [4]. For example, the Space Shuttle is
totally dependent on the proper operation of its computers; a mission cannot
even be aborted if the computers fail [4). As another example, the new unstable,
fuel-efficient aircraft require computer control to provide the fine degree of con
trol surface actuation required to maintain stability. The Grumman X-29, for
example, is flown by digital computers. If the digital computers fail, there is a
backup analog system. However, the switch to the backup system must be done
at a speed that precludes human control.
Direct monitoring or control of hazardous processes by computers is not the
only source of problems. Some computers provide indirect control or data for
critical processes, such as the attack warning system at NORAD, where errors
can lead to potentially erroneous decisions by the human operators or companion
systems. As an example of what can happen, in 1979 an error was discovered in
a program used to design nuclear reactors and their supporting cooling systems
[lOl]. The erroneous part of the program dealt with the strength and structural
support of pipes and valves in the cooling system. The program had supposedly
guaranteed the attainment of earthquake safety precautions in operating reactors.
The discovery of the program error resulted in the Nuclear Regulatory Commis
sion shutting down five nuclear power plants.
Since computers are currently being used to control safety critical systems,
potential problems should now be apparent. Space, military, and aerospace sys
tems have been the largest users of safety critical software. And indeed, software
faults are believed to account for many operational failures of these systems
[13,49]. Some incidents axe cited as examples throughout this paper. For those
who are interested in finding out more about actual incidents, many examples
have been collected by Neumann [104]. Frola and Miller [39] describe aircraft
accidents and near-accidents caused by software faults. Bassen, et.al, [9] cite
examples of serious problems in medical devices. Reiner [116] reports pilot con
cerns about computer malfunctions, unexpected mode changes, loss of data, and
other anomalies of flight guidance systems.
System Safety — An Overview
Safety is a system problem. In order to understand and provide new tech
niques to handle the software aspects of the problem, it is necessary first to
understand something about the general field of system safety. Knowledge of the
techniques and approaches used in building safety-critical electromechanical dev
ices will aid in designing new techniques for software as well as in ensuring that
these new techniques will interface with the hardware approaches and tools.
Ideally, global integrated techniques and tools can be developed that apply
system-wide.
System safety became a concern in the late 1940's and was defined as a
separate discipline in the late 1950's [118,120]. A major impetus was that the mis
sile systems developed in the 1950's and early 1960's required a new approach to
controlling hazards associated with weapon systems 120]. The Minuteman ICBM
was one of the first systems to have a formal, disciplined system safety program
associated with it. NASA soon recognized the need to have system safety as part
of their programs, and there have been extensive system safety programs for
space activities. Eventually, the programs pioneered by the military and NASA
were adopted by commercial industry in such areas as nuclear power, refining,
mass transportation, and chemicals.
System safety is a subdiscipline of system engineering that involves the
application of scientific, management, and engineering principles to ensure ade
quate safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost
throughout the system life cycle. Note that safety here is regarded as a relative
term. Although it is often defined as "freedom from those conditions that can
cause death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or
property" [92], it is generally recognized that this is unrealistic [44]. By this abso
lute definition, any system that presents an element of risk is unsafe. But almost
any system that produces personal, social, or industrial benefits contains an
indispensable element of risk [18]. For example, safety razors and safety matches
are not sa/c, only safer than their alternatives. They present an acceptable level
of risk while preserving the benefits of the devices they replace. No aircraft could
fly, no automobile move, and no ship put out to sea if all hazards had to be elim
inated first [48].
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that attempts to eliminate risk often
result in risk displacement rather than risk elimination [86]. For example,
nitrates in food may cause cancer but their elimination could cause deaths by
botulism. Benefits and risks often have tradeoffs — e.g., trading off the benefits of
improved medical diagnosis capabilities against the risks of exposure to diagnostic
X-rays. Unfortunately, the question "How safe is safe enough?" has no simple
answer [96,97].
Safety is also relative in that nothing is completely safe under all conditions.
There is always some case in which a relatively safe material or piece of equip
ment becomes hazardous. The act of drinking water is usually considered safe,
but drinking too much water can cause kidney failure [44]. Thus safety is a rela
tive concept that is a function of the situation in which it is measured. One
definition might be that safety is a measure of the degree of freedom from risk in
any environment.
In order to understand the relationship between computers and safety, it is
helpful to consider the nature of accidents in general. An accident is traditionally
defined by safety engineers as an unwanted and unexpected release of energy [58].
However, release of energy is not involved in some hazards associated with new
technologies (e.g., recombinant DNA) and potentially lethal chemicals. There
fore, the term mishap is often used to denote an unplanned event or series of
events that results in death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of
equipment or property, or environmental harm. The term mishap includes both
accidents and harmful exposures.
Mishaps are caused almost without exception by multiple factors, and the
relative contribution of each is usually not clear [39,48,55,58,110,111,117]. A
mishap may be thought of as a set of events combining together in random
fashion [ill] or, alternatively, as a dynamic mechanism that begins with the
activation of a hazard and flows through the system as a series of sequential and
concurrent events in a logical sequence until the system is out of control and a
loss is produced (the "domino theory") [86]. Either way, major incidents often
have more than one single cause, and it is usually difficult to place blame on any
one event or component of the system. The high frequency of complex, multifac-
torial mishaps may arise from the fact that the simpler potentials have been anti
cipated and handled. But the very complexity of events leading up to a mishap
implies that there may be many opportunities to intervene or interrupt the
sequences [58]. Three Mile Island is a good example.
The mishap at Three Mile Island [110] involved four independent failures
(see figure 1). It started in the secondary cooling system where some water leaked
out of the condensate polisher system through a leaky seal. The moisture got
>«#4CTiOB
FIGURE 1
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and Perrow, C. Noinnal Accidents, Basic Books, 1984.
into the instrument air system, interrupting the air pressure applied to two feed-
water pumps. This interruption erroneously signalled to the pumps that some
thing was wrong and that they should stop. When the cold water flow is inter
rupted, the turbine shuts down automatically (a safety device), and the emer
gency feedwater pumps come on to remove the heat from the core. Unfor
tunately, two pipes were blocked; a valve in each pipe had been accidentally left
in a closed position after maintenance two days before. The emergency pumps
came on (which was verified by the operator), but he did not know that they
were pumping water into a closed pipe. There were two indicators on the control
panel that showed that the valves were closed instead of open. One was obscured
by a repair tag hanging on the switch above it. But at this point the operators
were unaware of the problem with emergency feedwater and had no occasion to
make sure those valves, which are always open except during tests, were indeed
open. Eight minutes later, when they were baffled by the performance of the
plant, they discovered it. By then much of the initial damage had been done. It
is interesting that some experts thought the closed valves constituted an impor
tant operator error, while other experts held that it did not make much difference
whether the valves were closed or not, since the supply of emergency feedwater is
limited and worse problems were happening anyway.
With no heat being removed from the core, the reactor "scrammed" (a pro
cess that stops the chain reaction). Normally there are thousands of gallons of
water in the primary and secondary cooling systems to draw off the intense heat
of the reactor core, but the cooling system was not working. An automatic safety
device, called a pilot-operated relief valve (PORV), is supposed to relieve the
pressure. Unfortunately, it just so happened that with the block valves closed,
one indicator hidden, and the condensate pumps out of order, the PORV failed to
close after the core had relieved itself sufficiently of pressure. Since there had
been problems with this relief valve before, an indicator had recently been added
to the valve to warn operators if it did not reseat. Unfortunately, this time the
indicator itself failed, probably because of a faulty solenoid.
Note that at this point in the mishap, there had been a false signal causing
the condensate pumps to fail, two valves for emergency cooling out of position
and the indicator obscured, a PORV that failed to reseat, and a failed indicator
of its position. Perrow claims that the operators could have been aware of none
of these. From that point on, there is considerable debate about whether the fol
lowing events in the mishap were the result of operator errors or events beyond
what the operators could have been resisonably expected to L. able to hand^o.
The point is that the mishap was caused by many contributm^ factors.
It is interesting to note that some of the events contributing to this mishap
involved failures of safety devices. In fact, ssifety devices have more than once
been blamed for causing losses or increasing the chances of mishaps [110]. For
example, in Ranger 6 (designed to survey the moon) redundant power supplies
and triggering circuits were used to ensure that the television cameras would
come on to take pictures of the moon's surface. But a short in a safety device (a
testing circuit) depleted the power supplies by the time Ranger 6 reached the
moon. It hcLS been noted that the more redundancy is used to promote safety,
the more chance for spurious actuat; ; "redundancy is not always the correct
design option to use" [138]. Another ^ .mple of a safety device causing a mishap
can be found in the core meltdown at ..e Fermi breeder reactor near Detroit [41]
where a triangular piece of zirconium, installed at the insistence of an indepen
dent safety advisory group, broke off and blocked the flow of sodium coolant. A
software example occurred with a French meteorological satellite [7], The com
puter was supposed to issue a "read" instruction to some high altitude weather
balloons but instead ordered an "emergency self-destruct." The self-destruct
instruction had been included to ensure that no mishaps would occur from out-
of-control balloons. As a result of the software error, 72 of the 141 weather bal
loons were destroyed.
Finally, mishaps often involve problems in subsystem interfa [39,48]. It
appears to be easier to deal with failures of components than failures in the inter
faces between components. This should not come as any surprise to software
engineers. Consider the large number of operational software faults that can be
traced back to requirements problems [11,33]. The software requirements are the
specific representation of the interface between the software and the processes or
devices being controlled. Another important interface is that between the
software and the underlying computer hardware. Iyer and Velardi [56] examined
software errors in a production operating system and found that 11% of all
software errors and 40% of all software failures were computer-hardware related.
How do engineers deal with safety problems? The earliest approach to
safety, called Operational or Industrial Safety, involves examining the system dur
ing its operational life and correcting what are deemed to be unacceptable
hazards. In this approach, accidents are examined, the causes determined, and
corrective action initiated. In some complex systems, however, a single accident
can involve such a great loss as to be unacceptable. The goal of System Safety is
to design an acceptable safety level into the system prior to actual production or
operation.
System safety engineering attempts to optimize safety by applying scientific
and engineering principles to identify and control hazards through analysis,
design, cind management procedures. The first step is hazard analysis, which
involves identifying and assessing the criticality level of the heizards and the risk
involved in the system design. The next step is to eliminate from the design the
identified hazards that pose an unacceptable level of risk or, if that is not possi
ble, to reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level. Procedures for accom
plishing these analysis and design objectives are described in separate sections of
this paper.
Management procedures are the third component of system safety engineer
ing. The root causes of mishaps often relate to poor management [ill]. Simi
larly, the degree of safety achieved in a system depends directly on management
emphasis. Safety engineers have carefully defined the requirements for manage
ment of safety-critical programs such as setting policy and defining goals, defining
responsibility, granting authority, documenting and tracking hazards and their
resolution (audit trails), and fixing accountability. Specific programs have been
outlined and procedures developed such as MORT (Management Oversight and
Risk Tree) [58], which is a system safety program originally developed for the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The application of safety management
techniques to the management of software development has been explored by
Trauboth and Frey [132]. This is an important area that deserves more investi
gation.
Why is there a problem?
System safety techniques have been developed to aid in building elec-
"~^omeGhanical-systems with minimal risk. Unfortunately, many of these tech
niques do not seem to apply when computers are introduced. By examining why
adding computers seems to complicate the problem and perhaps increzise risk, it
may be possible to determine how to change or augment the current techniques.
The major rezisons appear to stem from the differences between hardware and
software and from the lack of system-level approaches to building software-
controlled systems.
wuAJycPi
Before software was used in safety-critical systems, they were often con
trolled by conventional (non-programmable) mechanical and electronic devices.
System safety techniques are designed to cope primarily with random failures in
these systems. I Human design errors are not considered since it is assumed that
all faults caused by human errors can be avoided completely or located and
removed prior to delivery and operation [68]. This assumption is based on the
use of a systematic approach to design and validation as well as the use of
hardware modules proven through extensive prior use. It is justified due to the
relatively low complexity of the hardware.
With the advent of microprocessors and the possibility of powerful automa
tion procedures, there has been a dramatic increase in the complexity of the
software and hardware, .using a nonlinear increase in human error induced
design faults. Because of this complexity, it appears to be impossible to demon
strate that the computer hardware or the software of a realistic control system is
perfect and that failure mechanisms are completely eliminated [68]. Perrow [110]
has examined the factors involved in "system accidents" and has concluded that
they are intimately intertwined with complexity and coupling. By using comput
ers to control processes, we are increasing both these factors and therefore, if Per
row is right, inc.easing the potential for problems.
, An important difference between conventional hardware control systems and
computer-based control systems is that hardware has historical usage informa
tion, whereas software usually does not [43]. Hardware is generally produced in
greater quantities than software, and standard components are reused frequently.
Therefore, reliability can be measured and improved through experience in other
applications. Software, on the other hand, is almost always specially constructed
for each application. Although there is research being conducted on the reuse of
software and software design, extensive reuse of software (outside of mathemati
cal subroutine libraries or operating system facilities) or reuse of software design
is unlikely to occur soon in these special-purpose systems.
But lack of reuse is only part of the explanation for the added problems with
software. An excellent discussion of why software is unreliable can be found in
Parnas [109]. He argues that continuous or analog systems are built of com
ponents that, within a broad operating range, have an infinite number of stable
states and their behavior can be described by continuous functions. Most tradi
tional safety systems are analog, and their mathematics well understood. The
mathematical models can be analyzed to understand the system's behavior.
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Discrete state or digital systems are made from components with a finite
number of stable states. If digital subsystems have a relatively small number of
states or a repetitive structure, exhaustive analysis and exhaustive testing is pos
sible. But software has a large number of discrete states without the repetitive
structure found in computer circuitry. Although mathematical logic can be used
to deal with functions that are not continuous, the large number of states ajid
lack of regularity in the software results in extremely complex mathematical
expressions. Progress is being made, but we are far from being able to analyze
most realistic control-system software.
Not only is exhaustive testing and analysis impossible for most non-trivial
software, but it is difficult to provide realistic test conditions. It is often the case
that operating conditions differ from test conditions since testing in a real setting
(e.g., actually controlling a nuclear power plant or an aircraft that has not been
built yet) is impossible. Most testing must be done in a simulation mode, and
there is no way to guarantee that the simulation is accurate. Assumptions must
always be made about the controlled process and its environment."^
As an example of what can happen, the limits on the range of control
C'traver') imposed by the software for the F18 aircraft are based on assumptions
about the ability of the aircraft to get into certain attitudes. Unfortunately,
some of the intentionally excluded attitudes are attainable [102]. In another
mishap, a wing-mounted missile on the F18 failed to separate from the launcher
after ignition because a computer program signalled the missile-retaining mechan
ism to close before the rocket had built up sufficient thrust to clear the missile
from the wing [39]. An erroneous assumption had been made about the length of
time that this would take. The aircraft went violently out of control. As another
example, it has been reported that aviation software written in the northern hem
isphere often has problems when used in the southern hemisphere [13]. Finally,
software designed to bring aircraft to the altitude and speed for best fuel econ
omy has been blamed for flying the aircraft into dangerous icing conditions [124].
These types of problems are not caught by the usual simulation process since
they either have been considered and discarded as unreasonable or involve a
misunderstanding about the actual operation of the process being controlled by
the computer. After studying serious mishaps related to computers, system
safety engineers have concluded that and specification
errors are the greatest cause of software safety problems [35,45]. Testing can
only show consistency with the requirements eis specified; it cannot identify-
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misunderstandings about the requirements. These will be " 'T^atified o- / by use
of the software in the actual system which can, of course, to mishaps. Also,
accurate live testing of computer responses to catastrophic situations is, of course,
difficult in the absence of catastrophes.
^furthermore, the point in time or environmental conditions when the com
puter fault occurs may determine the serioxisness of the result. Softwau'e faults
may not be detectable except under just the right combination of circumstances.
It is difficult (and often impossible) to consider and account for all en' 'onmental
factors and all conditions under which the software may be operating. The
operating conditions may even change in systems that m^- or in which the
environment can change. For example, a computer iss ued a jse weapons bay
door command on a B-IA aircraft at a time when a mechanical inhibit had been
put in place in order to perform maintenance on the door. The close command
was generated when someone in the cockpit punched the close switch on the con
trol panel during a test. Two hours later, when the maintenance was completed
and the inhibit removed, the door unexpectedly closed. Luckily nobody was
injured [39]. The software was altered to discard any commands not completed
within a certain time frame, but this situation had never been considered during
testing.
To complicate things further, most verification and validation techniques for
software assume "perfect'* execution environments. But software failures may be
caused by undetected hardware errors such as transient faults causing mutilation
of data, security violations, human mistakes during operation ar. ; maintenance,
errors in underlying or supporting software, or interfacing prob ms with other
parts of the system such as timing errors. As another real example of what can
happen, in a fiy-by-wire flight control system, a mechanical malfunction set up an
accelerated environment for which the flight control computer was not pro
grammed. The aircraft went out of control and crashed [39]. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to test the software under all failure modes of the system. Trying to
include all of these factors in the analysis or testing procedures makes the prob
lem truly impossible to solve given today's technology.
It appears that the removal of all faults and perfect execution environments
cannot be guaranteed at this point in time (and perhaps never will be).^ Because
of this, there have been attempts to make software fault-tolerant. In this
approach, techniques are used to try to ensure that software will continue to
function correctly in spite of the presence of errors. 1
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For hardware, redundancy \can be used to provide fault tolerance since the
individual components can either be shown to fail independently or common
mode analysis techniques can detail dependent failure modes and minimize them.
A similar application of redundancy has been proposed for software [4]. But the
models and arguments used to prove that these methods will provide the ultra-
high reliability required in safety-critical software are based primarily on an
assumption of independence in failure behavior between independently produced
software versions. This assumption has been shown [61] to be unsubstantiated
for empirical data. Although reliability may in theory be increased [62], there is
not yet enough data to show that the amount of increase will justify the added
cost of producing multiple versions of the software. In fact, the added complexity
of providing fault-tolerance may itself cause run-time failures (e.g., the synchroni
zation problems caused by the back-up redundancy procedures on the first Space
Shuttle flight [42]). Perhaps the most important consideration is that- most
fault-tolerance methods do not solve the problem of erroneous requirements.
greatest cause of the problems experienced when computers are used to
control complex processes may be a lack of system-level methods and viewpoints.
Many hardware-oriented system engineers do not understand software due to the*
newness of software engineering and the significant differences between software
and hardware [35]. The same is true, only vice versa, for software engineers. This
has led to system engineers considering the computer as a^_^ck box [45,60,125]
while the software engineer has treated the computer as merely a stimulus-
response system [e.g., 1,26]. This lack of communication hcis been blamed for
several mishaps.
One such incident involved a chemical reactor [60]. The programmers were
told that if a fault occurred in the plant, they were to leave all controlled vari
ables ELS they were and to sound an alarm. One day, the computer received a sig
nal telling it that there was a low oil level in a gearbox (see figure 2). The com
puter reacted as the requirements specified: it sounded an alarm and left the
controls as they were. By coincidence, a catalyst had just been added to the
reactor and the computer had just started to increase the cooling-water flow to
the reflux condenser. The flow was therefore kept at a low value. The reactor
overheated, the relief valve lifted, and the contents of the reactor were discharged
into the atmosphere. The operators responded to the alarm by looking for the
cause of the low oil level. They established that the level was normal and that
the low-level signal was false but, by this time, the reactor had overheated.
IGEARBOXI
;atalys"
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SOURCE: Kletz, T. "Human problems with computer control," Hazard Prevention
March-April 1983, pp. 24-26.
- 13 -
Later study of the causes of the mishap [60] determined that the system
engineers had performed a hazard and operability study on the plant but that
those concerned had not understood what went on inside the computer. It is also
apparent that there was a misunderstanding by the programmer about what was
meant by the requirement that all controlled variables be left as they were when
a fault occurred — did this mean that the cooling-water valve should remain
steady or that the temperature should remain steady? A lack of understanding
of the process being controlled could have contributed to the programmer's con
fusion. Unfortimately, these situations are not imcommon.
An obvious conclusion from the above is that system-level approaches are
necessary [10,68,74,75]. Note that the software itself is not "unsafe." Only the
hardware that it controls can do damage. Treating the computer as a stimulus-
response system allows verifying only that the computer software itself is correct
or safe; there is no way to verify system correctness or system safety. To do the
latter, it must be possible to verify the correctness of the relationship between the
input and the system behavior (not just the computer output).
In fact, it is difficult to define a software "fault" without considering the sys
tem. If the problem stems from an error in the requirements, then the software
may be "correct" with respect to the stated software requirements, but wrong
from a system standpoint. It is the interaction between the computer and the
controlled process that is often the source of serious problems. For example, a
particular software fault may cause a mishap only if there is a simultaneous
human and/or hardware failure. Also, a failure of a component of the system
external to the computer may cause a software fault to manifest itself. Software
engineering techniques that do not consider the system cis a whole including the
interactions between hardware (computer and non-computer), software, and
human operators will have limited usefulness for real-time control software.
Implications and Challenges for Software Engineering
How does all this affect the software engineering practitioner and researcher?
Most major safety-critical system purchasers are becoming concerned with
software risk sind are incorporating requirements for software safety analysis and
verification in their contracts [35]. In many countries, a formal validation and
demonstration of the safety of the computers controlling safety-critical processes
is required by an official licensing authority. Standards for building safety-critical
wrong treatment
administered
computer fails
to raise alarm
vital signs exc
critical limits but
ot corrected in tim
sensor failure nurse does not
respond to alarm
nurse fails to input
vitals manually or
inov -.correct I
Figure 3: Top Levels of Patient Monitoring System Fault Tree
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systems [e.g., 92,93,94] often already include, or are being updated to include,
software-related requirements such as software hazard analysis and verification of
software safety.
The standards and licensing requirements are pushing researchers to find
strategies for designing and building computer hardware and software that satisfy
these standards and that can be certified by safety licensing authorities. Several
national •and international working groups are studying these problems and
attempting to promote and evaluate current practice and research.
The problem is complicated by the fact that safety involves many areas of
traditional software research, and where it fits in exactly has been a matter of
some controversy. Neumann [103] suggests that safety requires a merging of a
wide range of concepts including (among others) reliable hardware, reliable
(although not necessarily totally correct) software, fault tolerance, security,
privacy, and integrity. He adds that not only is the running software of concern,
but also its use, administration, and maintenance.
Safety has most frequently been argued to be a part of either reliability or
security. But even though these areas of traditional software research are related
to safety, changes or differences in emphasis may be required to apply them to
safety problelhs.'^'N^nd there are some aspects of software safety that are unique
with respect to current-software engineering concerns.
Reliability vs. Safety.
\.^ Safety and reliabilfty are often equated, especially with respect to software,
bu^tdiereis- ar growing trend to separate the two concepts. Reliability is usually
defined as the probability that a system will perform its intended function for a
specified period of time under a set of specified environmental conditions.
Although a more precise definition is given in a later section, safety is the proba
bility that conditions that can lead to a mishap (hazards) do not occur whether
the intended function is performed or not [35,63,74]. In general, reliability
requirements are concerned with making a system failure-free whereas safety
requirements are concerned with making it mishap-free. These are not
synonymous. There are many failures of differing consequences that are possible
in any complex system. The consequences may range from minor annoyance up
to death or injury. Reliability is concerned with every possible software error
whereas safety is only concerned with those that result in actual system hazards.
Not all software errors cause safety problems and not all software that functions
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according to specification is safe [35]. Severe misha' ^ have occurred • hile some
thing Wcis operating exactly as ir.zended — hat is, \ hout failure [120
It is convenient to separate the requirements of a system into those related
to the mission and those related to safety while the mission is being accom
plished. There are some systems in which safety is the mission, but these are
rare. It is more common to find that there are some requirements that are not
safety-related at all, some that are related to the mission and can result in a
mishap if the system is unable to satisfy them, and others that are unrelated to
the mission and are concerned only with preventing hazards. That is, a subset
(which may be all) of the requirements are related to ssifety. If the probability of
those requirements being satisfied i "ncreased, then safety will have been
increased. But the reliability of the s .em can also be increased by increasing
the satisfaction of the non-safety related requirements. Unfortunately, in many
complex systems, safety and reliability may imply conflicting requirements, and
thus the system cannot be built to maximize both.
Consider the hydraulic system of an aircraft. The reliability of that system
is more or less complementary to the safety. As the reliability increases, the
safety also increases [120]. That is, the probability of a mishap resulting from
hydraulic system failure decreases. The risk of a mishap increases as a result of
the inability of the system to perform its mission. In the case of munitions, the
opposite is true. Since reliability is the probabilitv of detonation or functioning
of the munition at the desired time and place whi. safety is related to inadver
tent functioning, there is no direct relationship. However, one would expect that
as the reliability of a munition is increased, the safety would decrease. That is,
procedures to increase the ability of the weapon to fire when desired may increase
the likelihood of accidental detonation. This is true unless the design of the muni
tion is modified to improve the safety as the reliability increases [120]. In fact,
the safest system is sometimes one that does not work at all. These same types
of conflicts can be found when comparing software design techniques [62].
Another aspect of reliability that has been equated with safety is availabil
ity. But like reliability, a system may be safe but not available and may also be
available but unsafe (e.g., operating incorrectly).
For the most -^art*, reliability models have merely counted failures, which is
tantamount to tre ng all failures equally. Recently there have been suggestions
that the relative severity of the consequences i faih:. s be considered
[22,29,67,71,84].
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Leveson [74] has argued that there is a need for a completely different
approach to safety problems that is complementary to standard reliability tech
niques. This approach focuses on the failures that have the most drastic conse
quences. Even if all failures cannot be prevented, it may be possible to ensure
that the failures that do occur are of minor consequence or that even if a poten
tially serious failure does occur, the system will "fail-safe".
This approach is useful under the following circumstances: (1) not all
failures are of equal consequence, and (2) there are a relatively small number of
failures that can lead to catcistrophic results. Under these circumstances, it is
possible to augment traditional reliability techniques that attempt to eliminate all
failures with techniques that concentrate on the high-cost failures. These new
techniques often involve a "backward" approach that starts with determining
what are unacceptable or high-cost failures and then ensures that these particular
failures do not occur or at least minimizes the probability of their occurrence.
This new approach and the traditional reliability approach are complementary,
but their goals and appropriate techniques are different.
Security vs. Safety
Safety and security are closely related. Both deal with threats or risks, one
with threats to life or property and the other with threats to privacy or national
security. They both often involve negative requirements that may conflict with
some important functional or mission requirements. Both involve global system
requirements that are difficult to deal with outside of a system context. Both
involve requirements that are considered of supreme importance (in relation to
other requirements) in deciding whether the system can and should be used.
That is, particularly high levels of assurance may be needed, and testing alone is
insufficient to establish the required level of confidence [65]. Both involve aspects
of a system that specific government agencies or licensing bureaus (e.g., National
Security Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission) regulate, and approval is
based on factors other than whether the system does anything useful or is
»
Fail-safe or fail-passive procedures attempt to limit the amount of damage caused by a
failure — there is no attempt to satisfy the functional specifications except where neces
sary to ensure safety. This contrasts with fail-operational behavior providing full func
tionality in the face of a fault. A fail-soft system continues operation but provides only
degraded performance or reduced functional capabilities until the fault is removed or the
run-time conditions change.
- 17 -
economically profitable.
These qualities lead to other similarities. Both may benefit from using tech
niques that are too costly to be applied to the system as a whole, e.g., formal
verification, but which may be cost effective for these limited subsets of the
requirements. Both also involve problems and techniques that apply specifically
to them and not to other more general functional requirements.
There are some differences, however, between safety and traditional security
research. Security has focused on malicious actions while safety is also concerned
with inadvertent actions. Furthermore, the primary emphasis in security
research has been on p" venting the imauthorized access to classi?«d information
as opposed to preventii. more general n licious a tions.
Safety as a Separate Research Topic
It would be possible to include safety under the category of security or relia
bility (or to possibly include one or both of these under safety). However, adding
safety to either reliability or security would require major changes in the way
that these two more traditional topics are defined and handled which might not
be practical. Much work highly applicable to software safety has been accom
plished in the areas of software reliability and security, and regardless of whether
they are separate or integrated, all three obviously have a close relationship.
Laprie and Costes [67] have suggested that the three be differentiated but all con
sidered under the general rubric of "dependability."
Leveson hcis argued [74] that it would be beneficial to consider safety as a
separate research topic for several reasons. First, separation of concerns allows
the safety aspects of systems to be culled and considered together in a smaller
realm, potentially making solutions easier to generate. "Divide and conquer" is a
time-honored approach to handling complexity.
Separate consideration also allows special emphasis and separation of con
cerns when decisions are being made. The construction of any large, complex
system requires weighing alternative and conflicting goals. In automobiles, for
example, safety and fuel-economy may vary inversely as design parameters such
as weight are changed. The quality and usefulness of the resulting system will
depend on how the tradeoffs are made. To ensure that the 'al system is safe, it
is necessary to make explicit any tradeoffs that involve i^u'ety. Resolution of
conflicts in a consistent and well-reasoned manner (rather than by default or by
the whim of some individual programmer) requires that safety requirements be
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separated and identified and that responsibilities be assigned.
In system engineering, reliability and safety are usually distinguished. This
distinction has arisen from actual experiences in building safety-critical systems.
For example, an early major antiballistic missile system had to be replaced
because of serious mishaps caused by previously unnoticed interface problems
[118]. Later analysis suggested that the mishaps stemmed from a lack of specific
identification and assignment of responsibility for safety. Instead, safety was con
sidered to be every designer's and engineer's responsibility. Since that time, sys
tem safety has received more and more attention with strict standards being
issued and enforced. When softwcire constitutes an important part of a safety-
critical system, software safety needs to be given the same type of attention.
Software engineers may find these distinctions and issues forced on them
soon. As mentioned earlier, government regulations and liability laws are begin
ning to require that the builders of safety-critical systems establish safety stan
dards and programs to verify the safety of the software involved. Current
software reliability enhancing techniques and software reliability assessment
models do not satisfy these requirements. New techniques and approaches are
needed along with new perspectives and emphases.
The rest of this paper establishes a starting point for those interested in this
new research area. Some preliminary definitions are first advanced and then a
survey of some of the currently available techniques is presented. In each section,
basic system safety concepts are followed by their implications for software.
Emphasis is placed on describing open research questions. As the reader will see,
there are many interesting and important questions to be answered. Finally, since
the purpose of this paper is to interest more people in software safety problems
and issues, an extended bibliography is included at the end to provide some gui
dance for further search. Some papers have been included for completeness that
have not been directly referenced in this survey.
Definitions
Definitions tend to be controversial in a relatively new area of research and
as more is learned, they often change. However, in order to have a place to start,
some preliminary working definitions will be given. In order to further communi
cation and the exchange of ideas, an attempt has been made to make these
definitions as consistent as possible with those of system safety.
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' has been argued that there is no such thing as software safety since
softv. ..e cannot, by iic-elf, be unsafe. However, since software by itself is of little
value to anyone other than a programmer, a broader system view is that software
can have various unexpected and undesired effects when used in a complex sys
tem [27]. Note that the same argument can be made about correctness (when
correctness is considered in a larger sense than just consistency with the specified
requirements). Software is only correct or incorrect with respect to some larger
system in which it is functioning.
A system is the sum total of all its component parts working together within
a given environment to achieve a given purpose or mission within a given time
over a given life span [117|. If safety is defined in terms of a mishap or catzis-
trophic event, then difficulties arise from the fact that mishaps are often multifac-
torial and may involve conditions in the environment (i.e., not part of the system
being considered or evaluated) over which the designer has no control. Would
one say that the computer has not done anything dangerous if it fails to sound a
warning or close a gate at a railroad crossing when a train is approaching just
because no car happens to be at the crossing at that particular time or because
the driver is alert enough to see the train coming and stops anyway? In fact, a
near-miss is usually considered a safety problem. For exajnple, the software
would be considered unsafe in an air traffic control system if it caused two air
craft to violate minimum separation distances whether a collision actually
resulted or not (which may be dependent on pilot and air traffic controller alert
ness and perhaps luck).
Instead, safety must be defined in terms of hazards or states of the system
that when combined with certain environmental conditions could lead to a
mishap. Risk is a function of the probability of the hazardous state occurring,
the probability of the hazard leading to a mishap, and the perceived severity of
the worst potential mishap that could result from the hazard. Thus there are
two aspects of risk: (1) the probability of the system getting into a hazardous
state (e.g., the probability of the air traffic control softwzire giving information to
the air traffic controller that could lead to two aircraft violating minimum
separation eissurance) and (2) the probability of the hzizard leading to a mishap
(e.g., the probability of the two aircraft actually colliding) combined with the
severity of the resulting mishap. The former is sometimes referred to as the
hazard probability while the latter is sometimes called the danger or hazard criti-
cality. System hazards may be caused by hardware component failure, design
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faults in the hardware or software, interfacing (communication and timing) prob
lems between components of the system, human error in operation or mainte
nance, or environmental stress.
In summary, the state of the system is comprised of the states of the com
ponents of the system, one of which is the computer. Often the computer func
tions as a controller of the system and thus has a direct effect on the current
state. Therefore, it makes sense to talk of "software safety" since the software
usually has at least partial control over whether the system is in a hazardous
state or not. That is, system safety involves the entire hazardous state of the
system whereas component safety involves just the part of the hazcirdous state
that the component comprises or controls. Each component may make a contri
bution to the safety or unsafety of the system state and that contribution
comprises the safety (or risk) of the component.
Software safety then involves ensuring that the software will execute within
a system context without resulting in unacceptable risk. What risk is acceptable
or unacceptable must be defined for each system and often involves political,
economic, and moral decisions outside the decision-making realm of the softwgure
engineer. As with "hardware safety", software safety is achieved by identifying
potential hazards early in the development process and then establishing require
ments and design features to eliminate or control these hazards [35]. Safety-
critical software functions are those that can directly or indirectly cause or allow
a hazardous system state to exist. Safety-critical software is software that con
tains safety-critical functions.
Given these definitions to start from, attention can be turned to some
aspects of software safety that are of particular concern to the software engineer
including requirements analysis, verification, cLSsessment, and design of safety-
critical software. The goal is not to provide a complete description of all related
work, but instead to provide the reader with some information about the status
of the field and the important research issues.
Analysis and Modeling
System safety analysis starts at the early concept formation stages of a pro
ject and continues throughout the life cycle of the system. Various analyses are
performed at different stages including Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Sub
system Hazard Analysis (SSHA), System Hazard Analysis (SHA), and Operating
- 21 -
and Support zard lysis (OSHA). These are describer )riefly in , ppendix
B. Recently, .e neec. *software hazard analysis has been recognized. In this
section, after a brief in. jduction to hazard analysis in general, software hazard
analysis is defined and proposed techniques to accomplish it are described.
The purpose of system safety modeling and analysis is to show that the sys
tem is safe if it operates as intended and to show that it is safe in the presence of
faults. In proving the safety of a complex system in the presence of faults, it is
necessary to show that no single fault can cause a hazardous effect and that
hazards resulting from sequences of failures are sufficiently remote. The latter
approaches the impossible if an attempt is made to combine all possible failures
in all possible sequences and to analyze the output. Because of this, syste:-
safety analysis procedures often involve techniques that first define what is hazai
dous and then work backward to find all combinations of faults that produce the
event. When using probabilistic analysis, the probability of occurrence of the
event can then be calculated and the result evaluated as to acceptability.
The first step in any safety program is to identify hazards and categorize
them with respect to criticality and probability (i.e., risk). This is called a Prel
iminary Hazard Analysis. Potential hazards to be considered include nojmal
operating modes, maintenance modes, system failure modes, failures or unusual
incidents in the environment, and errors in human performance. Hazards for
some particular types of systems are identified by law or government standards.
For example, the U.S. DoD requires that the following be considered in any
hazard analysis for nuclear weapon systems [94]:
• inadvertent nuclear detonation
• inadvertent prearming, arming, launching, firing, or releasing of any nuclear
weapon in all normal or credible abnormal environments
• deliberate prearming, arming, launching, firing, or releasing of any nuclear
weapon, except upon execution of emergency war orders or when directed by
♦
a competent authority.
Once hazards are identified, they are assigned a severity and probability.
Hazard severity involves a qualitative measure of the worst credible mishap that
could result from the hazard. Appendix A shows some typical hazard
• ! .Note the inclusion of what are usually considered security issues within the safety stan
dards.
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categorization strategies. Identification and categorization of hazards by severity
may be adequate during the early design phase of a system. Later, qualitative or
quantitative probability ratings are often assigned to the hazards.
Typical qualitative probability categories might include: frequent (likely to
occur often), occaisional (will occur several times in life of system), reasonably
remote (likely to occur sometime in life of item), remote (unlikely to occur but
possible), extremely remote (probability of occurrence cannot be distinguished
from zero), and physically impossible. Quantitative probability assessment is
•7
often stated in terms of likelihood of occurrence of the hazard, e.g., 10" over a
given time period.
Once the Preliminary Hcizard Analysis is completed, software hazard
analysis can begin. Software safety modeling and analysis techniques identify
softw2ire hazards and safety-critical single and multiple failure sequences, deter
mine software safety requirements including timing requirements, and analyze
and measure software for safety. As mentioned previously, software safety
analysis and verification is beginning to be required by contractors of safety-
critical systems. For example, at least three DoD standards include related tasks.
A general safety standard [92] includes tasks for Software Hazard Analysis and
verification of software safety. An Air Force standard for missile and weapon
systems [93] requires a Software Safety Analysis and Integrated Software Safety
Analysis (which includes the analysis of the interfaces of the software to the rest
of the system, i.e., the assembled system). And the U.S. Navy has a draft stan
dard for nuclear weapon systems [94] that requires Software Nucleeir Safety
Analysis (SNSA). All of these analyses are not meant to substitute for regular
verification and validation, but instead involve special analysis procedures to ver
ify that the software is safe. It is not clear, however, that the procedures yet
exist that will satisfy these requirements.
As has been stressed repeatedly in this paper, the software must be analyzed
within the context of the entire system including the computer hardware, the
other components of the system (especially those that are being monitored
and/or controlled), and the environment. The next three sections discuss three
particular aspects of the software analysis and modeling activity, i.e., require
ments analysis, verification and validation, and measurement.
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Software Safety Requirements Analysis
Determining the requirements for software has proved very difficult. How
ever, in terms of safety (and probably most other software qualities), this may be
one of the most important sources of problems. Many of the mishaps cited in
this paper can be traced back to a fundamental misunderstanding about the
desired operation of the software. These examples are not unusual. As noted
earlier, after studying actual mishaps where computers were involved, safety
engineers have concluded that inadequate design foresight and specification errors
are the greatest cause of software safety problems [35,45]. These problems arise
from many possible causes including the difficulty of the problem intrinsically, a
lack of emphasis on it in software engineering research (which has tended to con
centrate on avoiding or removing implementation faults), and a ertain cubbyhole
attitude that has led computer scientists to concentrate on the computer eLsp^^cts
of the system and engineers to concentrate on the physical and mechanical p.irts
of the system with few people dealing with the interaction between the two [35].
While functional requirements often focus on what the system shall do,
safety requirements must also include what the system shall not do — including
mesins for eliminating and controlling system hazards and for limiting damage in
case of a mishap. An important part of the safety requirements is the
specification of the ways in which the software and the system can fail safely and
to what extent failure is tolerable.
Some requirements specification procedures have noted the need for special
safety requirements. The specifications for the A-7E aircraft include both
specification of undesired events and the appropriate responses to these events
[51]. SREM [1,2] treats safety-related requirements as a special type of non
functional requirement that must be systematically translated into functions that
are to be implemented by a combination of hardware and software.
Taylor [127] has suggested that goal specifications rather than the more com
mon input/output specifications may have advantages for analysis of errors eind
safety. Input/output specifications state the required relationship between inputs
and outputs of the software, at different points in time or as a function of time.
A goal specification states the conditions Jo be maintained (regulated) and the
conditions or changes to be achieved in the process that the software is control
ling. The goal specification can be compared and tested with respect to a model
of the environment, and faults can be detected.
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An important question, of course, is how to identify the software safety
requirements. Several techniques have been proposed and used in limited con
texts. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [135] is an analytical technique used in the
safety analysis of electromechanical systems. An undesired system state is
specified, and the system is then analyzed in the context of its environment and
operation to find credible sequences of events that can lead to the undesired
state. The fault tree is a graphic model of vairious parallel and sequential combi
nations of faults (or system states) that will result in the occurrence of the
predefined undesired event. The faults csin be events that are associated with
component hardware failures, human errors, or ztny other pertinent events that
can lead to the undesired event. A fault tree thus depicts the logical interrela
tionships of basic events that lead to the hazardous event. One possible problem
with the technique is that it is highly dependent on the ability of the person
doing the analysis. The analyst needs to thoroughly understand the system being-
analyzed and its underlying scientific principles.
An advantage in using this technique is that all the system components
(including humans) can be considered. This is extremely important since^ for
example, a particular software fault may cause a mishap only if there is a simul
taneous human and/or hardware failure. Alternatively, the environmental failure
may cause the software fault to manifest itself. Like the nuclear power plant
mishap at Three Mile Island, many mishaps are the result of a sequence of inter
related failures in different parts of the system.
The analysis process starts with the categorized list of system hazards that
have been identified by the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). A separate
fault tree must be constructed for each hazardous event. The basic procedure is
to assume that the hazard has occurred and then to work backward to determine
its set of possible causes. The root of the fault tree is the hazardous event to be
analyzed called the loss event. Necessary preconditions are described at the next
level of the tree with either an AND or an OR relationship. Each subnode is
expanded in a similar fashion until all leaves describe events of calculable proba
bility or are unable to be analyzed for some reason. Figure 3 shows part of a
fault tree for a hospital patient monitoring system.
Once the fault tree has been built down to the software interface (as in
figure 3), the high level requirements for software safety have been delineated in
terms of software faults and failures that could adversely affect the safety of the
system. Software control faults may involve:
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• failure to perform a required function, i.e., the function is never executed or
no answer is produced
• performing a function not required, i.e., getting the wrong answer or issuing
the wrong conttol instruction or doing the right thing but under inappropri
ate conditions (for example, activating an actuator inadvertently, too early,
too late, or failing to cease an operation at a prescribed time).
• timing or sequencing problems, e.g., failing to ensure that two things happen
at the same time, at different times, or in a particular order.
• failure to recognize a hazardous condition requiring corrective action
• producing the wrong response to a hazardous condition.
As the development of the software jroceeds, fault tree analysis can be performed
O- he design and finally the actual code.
Jahanian and Mok [57] have shown how to formalize the safety analysis of
timing properties in real-time systems using a formal logic RTL (Real Time
Logic). The system designer first specifies a model of the system in terms of
events and actions. The event-action model describes the data-dependency and
temporal ordering of the computational actions that must be taken in response to
events in a real-time application. This model can be mechanically translated into
RTL formulas. While the event-action model captures the timing requirements
of a real-time system, RTL is more amenable to mechanical manipulation by a
cor-outer in a formal analysis. In contrast to other forms of temporal logic
sp fication, RTL allows specification of the absolute timing of events —not only
their relative ordering — and provides a uniform i.y to incorporate different
scheduling disciplines in the inference mechanism.
To analyze the system design, the RTL formulas are transformed into predi
cates of Presburger Arithmetic with uninterpreted integer functions. Decision
procedures are then used to determine if a given safety assertion is a theorem
derivable from the system specification. If the safety assertion is derivable, then
the system is safe with respect to the timing behavior denoted by the safety
assertion cis long as the implementation satisfies the requirements specification. If
the safety assertion is unsatisfiable with respect to the specification, then the sys
tem is inherently unsafe because successful implementation of the requirements
will cause the safety assertion to be violated. Finally, if the negation of the
safety assertion is satisfiable under certain conditions, then additional constraints
must be imposed on the system to ensure its safety. Although a full Presbiirger
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arithmetic is inherently computationally expensive, a restricted set of Presburger
formuleis is used which allows for a more efficient decision procedure. Jahanian
and Mok also describe ways to restrict the design complexity in order to ease the
job of design verification.
Time Petri net models have also been proposed for software hazard analysis.
Petri nets [112] allow mathematical modeling of discrete-event systems. The sys
tem is modeled in terms of conditions and events and the relationship between
them. Analysis and simulation procedures have been developed to determine
desirable <ind undesirable properties of the design especially with respect to con
current or parallel events. Leveson and Stolzy [80,81] have developed analysis
procedures to determine software safety requirements (including timing require
ments) directly from the system design, to analyze a design for safety, recovera-
bility, and fault tolerance, and to guide in the use of failure detection and
recovery procedures. For most Ccises, the analysis procedures require construction
of only a small part of the reachability graph. Procedures are also being
developed to measure the risk of individual hazards.
Faults and failures can be incorporated into the Petri net model to deter
mine their effects on the system [81]. Backward analysis procedures can be used
to determine which failures and faults are potentially the most hazardous and
therefore which parts of the system need to be augmented with fault-tolerance
and fail-safe mechanisms. Early in the design of the system, it is possible to treat
the software parts of the design at a very high level of abstraction and consider
only failures at the interfaces of the software and non-software components. By
working backward to this software interface, it is possible to determine the
software safety requirements and identify the most critical functions. One possi
ble drawback to this approach is that building the Petri net model of the system
is a nontrivial exercise. Some of the effort may be justified by the use of the
model for other objectives, e.g., performance analysis. Petri net safety analysis
techniques have yet to be tried on a realistic system so there is no information
available on the practicality of the approach.
The whole area of requirements analysis is one needing more attention.
System-wide techniques that allow consideration of the controlled system rather
than just considering the software in isolation are in short supply.
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Verification and Validatio )f Safety
A proof of safety involves a choice (or combinacion) of the following:
1) showing that a fault cannot occur, i.e., that the software cannot get into an
unsafe state and cannot direct the system into an unsafe state or
2) showing that if a software fault occurs, it is not dangerous.
Boebert [10] has argued eloquently that verification systems that prove the
correspondence of source code to concrete specifications are only fragments of
verification systems. They do not go high enough (to an inspectable statement of
system behavior), and they do not go low enough (to the object code). The
verification system must also capture the semantics of the hardware.
Anderson anc tty [5] provided an early ai .mpt to specify wb is meant
by a proof of safet> . Instead of attempting to pre: -e the correctness . program
with respect to its original specification, a weaker criterion of acceptable behavior
is selected. That is, if the original specification is denoted by P, then a
specification Q is chosen such that:
a) any program that conforms to P will also conform to Q and
b) Q prescribes acceptable behavior of the program.
The program is then designed and constructed in an attempt to conform to P,
but so as to facilitate the provision of a much simpler proof of correctness with
respect to Q than would be possible using P. They term such a proof a proof of
adequacy. They identify a special case of adequacy termed safeness. This weaker
specification takes Q to be "P or error/'meajiing that the program should either
behave as weis originally intended or should termina.e with an explicit indication
of the reason for failure. A proof of safeness, in these terms, can rely on assert
statements holding when the program is executed since otherwise a failure indica
tion would be generated. Of course, a complete proof of safety would require
that the recovery procedures involved when an assert statement failed be verified
to ensure safe recovery.
Another verification methodology for safety involves the use of Software
Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) [77,128]. ^^Once the detailed design or code is com
pleted, software fault tree analysis procedures can be used to work backward
from the critical control faults determined by the top levels of the fault tree
through the program to verify whether the program can cause the top-level event
or mishap. The basi. chnique used is the same backward rea^ning (weakest
precondition) approaci .at has been used in formal axioma: verification [28],
but applied slightly difterently than is common in "proofs of coirectness."
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The set of states or results of a program can be divided into two sets —
correct and incorrect. Formal proofs of correctness attempt to verify that given a
precondition that is true for the state before the program begins to execute, then
the program halts and a postcondition (representing the desired result) is true.
That is, the program results in all and only correct states. For continuous, pur
posely non-halting (cyclic) programs, intermediate states involving output may
need to be considered. The basic goal of seifety verification is more limited. We
will assume that, by definition, the correct states are safe (i.e., that the designers
did not intend for the system to have mishaps). The incorrect states can then be
divided into two sets — those that are considered safe and those that are con
sidered unsafe. Software Fault Tree Analysis attempts to verify that the pro
gram will never allow an unsafe state to be reached (although it says nothing
about incorrect but safe states).
Since the goal in safety verification is to prove that something will not hap-
pen^^is- uaefd to use proof by contradiction. That is, it is assumed that the
software has produced an unsafe control action, and it is shown that this could
not happen since it leads to a logical contradiction. Although a proof of correct
ness should theoretically be able to show that software is safe, it is often imprac
tical to accomplish this because of the sheer magnitude of the proof effort
involved and because of the difficulty of completely specifying correct behavior.
In the few SFTA proofs that have been performed, the proof appears to involve
much less work than a proof of correctness (especially since the proof procedure
can stop as soon as a contradiction is reached on a software path). Also, it is
often easier to specify safety than complete correctness, especially since the
requirements may be actually mandated by law or government authority as with
nuclear weapon safety requirements in the U.S. Like correctness proofs, the
analysis may be partially automated, but highly skilled human help is required.
Details on how to construct the trees may be found in Leveson and Harvey
[77] and Taylor [128|. Software fault tree procedures for analyzing concurrency
and synchronization are described in Leveson and Stolzy [79]. Introducing timing
information into the fault tree causes serious problems. Fault tree analysis is
essentially a static analysis technique while timing analysis involves dynamic
aspects of the program. Taylor [128] has added timing information to fault trees
by making the assumption that information about the minimum and maximum
execution time for sections of code is known. Each node in the fault tree then
has an added component of execution time for that node. In view of the
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nondeterminism inherent in a multitasking environment, it may not be practical
to verify that uming problems cannot occur in all cases. However, information
gained from the fault tree can be used to insert run-time checks including dead
line mechanisms into the application program and the scheduler [78].
Fault trees can also be applied at the assembly language level to identify
computer hardware fault modes (such as erroneous bits in the program counter,
registers, or memory) that will cause the software to act in an undesired manner.
Mclntee [89| has used this process to examine the effect of single bit failures on
the software of a missile. The procedure identified credible hardware failures that
could result in the inadvertent early arming of the weapon. This information was
usrd to redesign the software so that the failure could be detected and a '*DUD"
(fail-safe) routine called.
Finally, fault trees may be applied to the software design before the actual
code is produced [76]. The purpose is to enhance the safety of the design while
reducing the amount of formal safety verification that is needed. Safe software
design techniques are discussed in a later section of this paper.
Experimental evidence of the practicality of SFTA is lacking. Examples of
two small systems (approximately 1000 lines of code) can be found in the litera
ture [77,89]. There is no information available on how large a system can be
analyzed with a realistic amount of effort and time. But even if the software is
so large that complete generation of the software trees is not possible, partial
trees may still be useful. For ample, peirtial analysis may still find faults.
Furthermore, partially complete .'tware fault trees may be used to identify criti
cal modules and critical functions which can then be augmented with software
fault tolerance procedures [50]. They may also be used to determine appropriate
run-time acceptance and safety tests [78].
In summary, software fault tree analysis can be used to determine software
safety requirements, to detect software logic errors, to identify multiple failure
sequences involving different parts of the system (hardware, human, and
software) that can lead to hazards, and to guide in the selection of critical run
time checks. It can also be used to guide testing. The interfaces of the software
parts of the fault tree can be examined to determine appropriate test input data
and appropriate simulation states and events.
Other analysis methods have been developed or are currently being
developed. Nuclear Safety Cross Check Analysis (NSCCA) [91] is a rigorous
methodology developed to satisfy U.S. Air Force requirements for nuclear
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systems. The method employs a large selection of techniques to attempt to show,
with a high degree of confidence, that the software will not contribute to a
nuclear mishap. The NSCCA process hcis two components: technical and pro-
cedural. The technical component evaluates the software by multiple analyses
and test procedures to assure that it satisfies the system's nuclear safety require
ments. The procedural component implements security and control me<isures to
protect against sabotage, collusion, compromise, or alteration of critical software
components, tools, and NSCCA results.
NSCCA starts with a two-step criticality analysis; (l) identification of
specific requirements that are the minimum positive measures necessary to
demonstrate that the nuclear weapon system software is predictably safe accord
ing to the general DoD standards for nuclear systems, and (2) analysis of each
function of the software to determine the degree to which it controls or influences
a nuclear critical event (e.g., prearming or arming). Qualitative judgment is used
to give each function an influence rating (high, medium, low), and suggestions are
made for the best methods to measure the software functions. The program
manager uses the criticality assessment to decide where to allocate resources to
meet the requirements, and an NSCCA plan is written. The program plan estab
lishes the tools and facilities requirements, test requirements, test planning, and
test procedures. This family of documents establishes in advance the evaluation
criteria, purpose, objectives, and expected results for specific NSCCA analyses
and tests in order to promote the independence of the NSCCA and to avoid rub-
berstamping.
NSCCA has the advantage of being independent of the software developers.
It spans the entire development cycle of the system so it is not just a post facto
analysis. However, whether NSCCA is effective depends upon the particular ana
lyses and test procedures that are selected.
Another more specialized technique, called Software Common Mode
Analysis, is derived from hardware common mode analysis techniques [106].
Redundant, independent hardware components are often used to provide fault
tolerance. A hardware failure that affects multiple redundant components is
called a common mode faUure. For example, if a power supply is shared by
redundant channels, then a single failure in the power supply will cause the
failure of more than one channel. Hardware common mode failure analysis exam
ines each connection between redundant hardware components to determine
whether the connection provides a path for failure propagation. If there are
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shared critical components or if the connection is not suitably buffered, then the
design must be changed to satisfy the independence requirement.
Noble argues that just as there is a potential for a hardware failure to affect
more than one redundant component via a hardware path, there is also a poten
tial for a hardware failure to affect the operation of redundant components
through a software path. For example, a processor could fail in ^uch away that
it sends out illegal.^esults that cause a supposedly independent processor to fail.
Software Common Mode Analysis examines the potential for a single failure to
propagate across hardware boundaries via a software path (usually a serial or
parallel data link or shzired memory). The process essentially involves a struc
tured walkthrough. All hardware intercr-.nections identified in the hardware
common mode analysis are examined to identify those with connections to
software. Then all software processes that receive input from the connection are
examined to determine whether any data items or combinations of data items csin
come through this interface and cause the process to fail. In some cases, the
analyst must examine a path through several modules before it can be deter
mined whether there is an undesired effect. Software Common Mode Analysis
has been used by Noble as part of the safety analysis of a commercial system, and
it did identify areas of common mode exposure in the design.
Sneak Software Analysis [133] is derived from hardware sneak circuit
analysis, and it has been claimed that it is useful for verification of software
safety. The software is translated into flow diagrams using electrical symbols
(i.e., into a circuit diagram) and examined to detect certain mtrol anomalies
such as unreachable code and unreferenced variables. It is basically just a stan
dard static software flow analysis. Much of this type of information is provided
by a good compiler. There are several problems with the technique. First, it
attempts to find all faults and therefore is more a reliability than a safety tech
nique. More important, it is unlikely that many serious faults will be found this
way. An analogy might be to try to find the errors in a book by checking the
grammar. In comparison with other software safety verification and analysis tech
niques which have been proposed, this appears to be the least useful.
There is much more to be learned about how to analyze safety. This section
has outlined some of what is known or has been suggested to date. A few of
these approaches have been tested and used extensively while others are still in
the development stage. None are sufficient to completely verify safety. For
example, most of the methods described assume that the program does not
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change while running. However, subtle faults can occur due to hardware failures
that alter a program or its flow of control. A program may also be altered as a
result of overwriting itself. Furthermore, all of the methods are complex and
error-prone themselves.
Many open questions remain such as:
• For systems of what size and level of complexity are these techniques practi
cal and \iseful?
• How can they be extended to provide more information?
• How can they most effectively be used in software development projects?
• What other approaches to software hazard analysis are possible?
Important work remains to be done in extending eind testing these proposed tech
niques and in developing new ones.
Assessment of Safety
It is possible that safety is not as amenable to quantitative treatment as reli
ability and availability [39]. As noted several times, mishaps are almost without
exception caused by multigjeJactors. Also, the probabilities tend to be so small
that assessment is extremely difTicult. For example, the frequency of mishaps for
any particular model of aircraft and cause or group of causes (such as those that
might be attributable to design or production deficiencies) is probably not great
enough to provide statistically precise assessments of whether or not the aircraft
has met a specified mishap rate [39]. But despite this, attempts at measurement
are being made.
There are three forms of quantitative risk analysis: single-valued best esti
mate, probabilistic, and bounding [96,97], Single-valued best estimate is useful
when a particular risk problem is well understood and enough information is
available to build determinate models and use best-estimate values for the
model's parameters. If the science of the problem is reasonably well understood
but only limited information is available about some important parameters, pro
babilistic analysis can be used that gives an explicit indication of the level of
uncertainty in the answers. In this case, the single-valued best estimates of
parameters are replaced by a probability distribution over the range of values
that the parameters are expected to take. If there is uncertainty about the func
tional form of the model that should be used, this uncertainty may also be
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incorporated into the model. Some problems are so little understood that a pro
babilistic analysis is not appropriate. However, in some of these cases it is possi
ble to use what little is known to at least b^^d the answer.
There are pros and cons in using any of these assessment techniques. Quanti
tative risk assessment can provide insight and understanding and allow com
parison of alternatives. The necessity to calculate very low probability numbers
forces a discipline on the analyst that requires studying the system in great
detail. But there is also the danger of placing implicit belief in the accuracy of a
calculated number. It is easy to place too much empheisis on the models and for
get the many assumptions that are implied. And since these approaches can
never capture all the factors, such as quality of life, th are important in a prob
lem, they should not become a substitute for careful hi. .an judgme: i [96,97].
Probably one of the most complex probabilistic risk analyses that has been
attempted is a U.S. reactor study WASH-1400 [83]. This was an enormously com
plex xmdertaking because of the many possible failures that could lead to a
mishap. This study has been criticized [85] for using elementary data that was
incomplete or uncertain and for making many unrealistic assumptions. For
example, independence of failures was assumed — common mode failures were
largely ignored. Also, it was assumed that nuclear power plants are built to plcui
and are properly operated. Recent events suggest that this may not be the case.
Critics also maintain that the uncertainties are very large, and therefore the cal
culated risk numbers are not very accurate.
Another example of the problems associated with formal safety assessment is
the "Titanic Effect". The Titanic was thought to be so safe that some normal
safety procedures were neglected, resulting in many more lives being lost than
might have been necessary. Unfortunately, certain assumptions were made in the
analysis that did not hold in practice. For example, the ship was built to stay
afloat if four or less of the sixteen water-tight compartments (spaces below the
waterline) were flooded. Previously, there had never been an incident where
more than four compartments of a ship were damaged so this assumption was
considered reasonable. Unfortunately, the iceberg ruptured five spaces. It can be
argued that the assumptions were the best possible given the state of knowledge
at that time. The mistake was in placing too much faith in the assumptions and
the models and in not taking measures in case they were incorrect. Much effort is
frequently diverted to proving theoretically that a system meets a stipulated level
of risk when the effort could much more profitably be applied to eliminating.
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minimizing, and controlling hazards [48]. This seems especially true when the
system contains software. Considering the inaccuracy of our present models for
a.ssessing software reliability, some of the resources applied to assessment might
be more effectively utilized if applied to sophisticated software engineering and
software safety techniques. Models are important, but care and judgment must
be exercised in their use.
Since safety is a system quality, models that assess it must consider all com
ponents of the system. Few currently do so when the system contains programm
able subsystems. In general, the expected frequency with which a given mishap
will occur (M) is:
M = Prob (hazard occurs) * Prob (hazard leads to a mishap)
For example, if a computer has a control function, such as controlling the move
ment of a robot, a simple model [25] is:
M = Prob(computer causes a spurious or unexpected machine movement) *
Prob (human in field of movement) * Prob (human has no time to move or
will fail to diagnose the robot failure).
As another example, given that the computer has a continuous protective or
monitoring function along with a requirement to initiate some safety function on
detection of a potentially hazardous condition:
M = Prob(dangerous plant condition arising) * Prob(failure of computer to
detect it) * Prob(failure of computer to initiate safety function) *
Prob(failure of safety function to prevent hazard) * Prob(conditions occur
ring that will cause hazard to lead to a mishap).
Note that the mishap probability or risk will be overstated if all computer failures
are included and not just those that may lead to hazards. Furthermore, the
analysis is an oversimplification since it assumes that the factors that comprise
the mishap are statistically independent. However, the probability of a hazard
leading to an accident may not be independent of the probability of a hazard
occurring. For example, the probability of a person being in the field of
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movement of a robot may be higher 1 'he robot is behaving strangf ; the ope
tor may have approached in order to investigate. A more sophis. .ated mouei
would also include such factors as the exposurt time of the hazard (the amount of
time that the hazard exists or, to state it another way, the average time to detec
tion and repair). The longer the exposure of the hazard, the more likely that
other events or conditions will occur that will cause the hazard to lead to a
mishap. That is, if an event sequence is involved, exposure time for the first fault
must be short or the fault must be rare in order to minimize the probability of a
mishap [95].
Probabilities of complex fault sequences are often analyzed by using fault
tree' Probabilities can be attached to the nodes of the tree, and the probability
of system and minimal cut set failures can be calc ulated. Minimal cut .^ets are
composed of all the unique combinations of component events that can cause the
top level event. To determine the minimal cut sets of a fault tree, the tree is first
translated to its Boolean equations, and then Boolean algebra is used to simplify
the expressions and to remove redundancies.
The question of how to assess software safety is still very much an unsolved
problem. High software reliability figures do not necessarily mean that the
software is acceptable from the safety standpoint. Several researchers
[16,22,29,36,37,38,63] have attempted to assess the safety of software using
software reliability models either by applying the model only to the critical func-
tio'-? or modules or by adding penalty cost or severity to the model. Arlat and
La, rie [8] have defined measures of safety and reliability using homo'^eneous Mar
kov processes.
This is an area of research that has many interesting questions including
when and how safety assessment should be used and how it can be accomplished.
There also needs to be some way of combining software and hardware assess
ments to provide system measurements.
Design for Safety
Once the hazardous system states have been identified and the software
safety requirements determined, the system must be built to minimize risk and to
satisfy these requirements. It is not possible to ensure the safety of a system by
analysis and verification alone because these techniques are so complex as to be
error-prone themselves, the cost may be prohibitive, and elimination of all
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hazards may require too severe a performance penalty. Therefore, hazards will
need to be controlled during the operation of the software, and this has impor
tant implications for design.
System safety has an accepted order of precedence for applying safety design
techniques. At the highest level, a system is intrinsically safe if it is incapable of
generating or releasing sufficient energy or causing harmful exposures under nor
mal or abnormal conditions (including outside forces and environmental failures)
to cause a hazardous occurrence, given the equipment and personnel in their most
vulnerable condition [86].
If an intrinsically safe design is not possible or practical, then the next step
in design is to prevent or minimize the occurrence of hazards. This can be
accomplished in hardwcire through such techniques as monitoring and automatic
control (e.g., automatic pressure relief valves, speed governors, limit-level sensing
controls), lockouts, lockins, and interlocks [48]. A lockout device prevents an
event from occurring or prevents someone from entering a dangerous zone. A
lockin is provided to maintain an event or condition. Finally, an interlock
ensures that a sequence of operations occurs in the correct order. That is, it is
provided to enstire that event A does not occur (l) inadvertently (e.g., a prelim
inary, intentional action B is required before A can occur), (2) while condition C
exists (e.g., an access door is placed on high voltage equipment so that when the
door is opened, then the circuit is opened), and (3) before event D (e.g., the tank
will fill only if the vent valve has been opened first).
The next lower level of precedence is to design to control the hazard if it
occurs using automatic safety devices. This includes detection of hazards and
fail-safe designs as well as damage control, containment, and isolation of hazards.
The lowest level of precedence is to provide warning devices, procedures, and
training to help personnel react to the hazard.
Many of these system safety design principles are applicable to software.
Note that software safety is not an afterthought to software design — it needs to
be designed in from the beginning. There are two general design principles: (l)
the design should provide leverage for the verification effort by minimizing the
amount of verification required and simplifying the certification procedure, and
(2) any design features to increase safety must be carefully evaluated in terms of
any complexity that might be added. An increase in complexity may have a
harmful effect on safety (as well as reliability).
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A safe software design includes not only standard software engineering and
fault tolerance techniques to enhance reliability, but also special safety features.
The emphasis here will be to survey those design features that are directly related
to safety. Risk can be reduced by reducing hazard likelihood or severity or both.
Hazards can be prevented, or they can be detected and treated. Prevention of
hazards tends to involve reducing functionality or design freedom while detection
is difficult and unreliable.
Preventing Hazards Through Software Design
Preventing hazards through design involves designing the software so that
faults and failures cannot cause hazards. That is, •' software design is made
intrinsically safe or the number of software hazards is . nimized.
Software can cause problems through acts of omission (failing to do some
thing required) or commission (doing something that should not be done or doing
something at the wrong time or in the wrong sequence). Software is usually
extensively tested to try to ensure that it does what it is specified to do. But due
to its complexity, it may be able to do a lot more than the software designers
specified (or intended). Design features can be used to limit the actions of the
software.
As an example, it may be possible to use modularization and data access
limitation to separate non-critical functions from critical functions and to ensure
that failures of non-critical modules cannot put the system into a hazardous
state, e.g., cannot impede the operation of the safety-critical functions. The basic
idea is to reduce the amount of software that affects safety (and thus to reduce
the verification effort involved) and to change as many potentially critical faults
into non-critical faults as possible. The separation of critical and non-critical
functions may be difficult, however. In any certification arguments that are
based on this approach, it will be necessary to provide supporting analyses that
prove that there is no way that the safety of the system can be compromised by
faults in the non-critical software.
Often in safety-critical software there are a few modules and/or data items
that must be carefully protected because their execution (or in the case of data,
their destruction or change) at the wrong time can be catcistrophic, e.g., the insu
lin pump administers insulin when the blood sugar is low or the missile launch
routine is inadvertently activated. It has been suggested [65] that security tech
niques involving authority limitation may be useful in protecting safety-critical
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functions and data. Security techniques devised to protect against malicious
actions can be used sometimes to protect against inadvertent but dangerous
actions. In this approach, the safety-critical parts of the software are sepsu-ated
using the above techniques, and an attempt is made to limit the authority of the
rest of the software to do anything ssdety-critical. The safety-critical routines
can then be carefully protected. For example, the ability of the software to arm
and detonate a weapon might be severely limited and carefully controlled with
multiple confirmations required. Note that this is another example of safety pos
sibly conflicting with reliability. To maximize reliability, it is desirable that
faults be unable to disrupt the operation of the weapon. However, for safety,
faults should lead to non-operation. That is, for reliability the goal is a multi
point failure mode while safety is enhanced in this case by a single-point failure
mode.
Authority limitation with regard to inadvertent activation can also be imple
mented by retaining a person in the loop. That is, a positive input by a human
controller may be required prior to execution of certain commamds. Obviously,
the human will require some independent source of information on which to base
the decision besides the information provided by the computer.
In some systems, it is impossible to always avoid hazardous states. In fact,
they may be required for the system to accomplish its function. A general
software design goal is to minimize the amount of time a potentially hazardous
state exists. One simple way this can be accomplished is to start out in a safe
state cind require a change to a higher risk state. Also, critical flags and condi
tions should be set or checked as close to the code that they protect as possible.
Finally, critical conditions should not be complementary (e.g., absence of the arm
condition should not mean safe).
Often the sequence of events is critical. For example, a valve may need to
be opened prior to filling a tank in order to relieve pressure. In electromechanical
systems, an interlock is used to ensure sequencing or to isolate two events in
time. An example is a guard gate at a railroad crossing that keeps people from
crossing the track until the train hcis passed. Equivalent design features often
need to be included in software. Programming language concurrency and syn
chronization features are used to order events, but do not necessarily protect
against inadvertent branches caused either by a software fault (in fact, they are
often so complex as to be error-prone themselves) or by a hardware fault (a seri
ous problem, for example, in aerospace systems where hardware is subject to
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unusual environmental stress such as cosmic ray bombardment). Some protec
tion can be afforded by the use of batons (a variable that is checked before the
function is executed to ensure that the previously required routines Kave entered
their signature) and handshaking. Another example of designing to protect
against hardware failure is to ensure that bit patterns used to satisfy a condi
tional branch to a safety-critical function do not use common failure patterns
(i.e., all zeros).
Finally, Neumann [I05j has suggested the application of hierarchical design
to simultaneously attain a variety of important requirements such as reliability,
availability, security, privacv. integrity, timely resoonsiveness, long-term evolva-
bility, and safety. By accc lodating all of these quirements with.n a unified
hierarchy, he claims that .i sensible ordering of agrees of criticality can be
achieved that is directly and naturally related to the asign structure.
Detection and Treatment at Run-Time
Along with attempts to prevent hazards, it may be necessary to attempt to
detect and treat them during execution. It is helpful to divide the latter tech
niques into those concerned with detection of unsafe states and those that i. olve
response to unsafe states once they have been detected.
Ad hoc tests for unsafe conditions can be programmed into any softwsire, but
some general mechanisms have been proposed and implemented including asser
tions, exception-handling, external monitors, and watchdog timers. Surveys of
run-time fault detection techniques can be found in Anderson and Lee [4], Yau
and Cheung [144], and Allworth [3].
Monitors or checks may be in-line or external, and they may be at the same
or a higher level of hierarchy. In general, it is important (l) to detect unsafe
states as quickly as possible in order to minimize exposure time, (2) to have mon
itors that are independent from the application software so that iV.ults in one can
not disable the other, and (3) to have the monitor add as little complexity to the
system as possible. A general design for a scifety monitor facility is proposed in
Leveson, Shimeall, Stolzy, Thomas [82].
Although many mechanisms have been proposed to help implement fault
detection, little assistance is provided for the more difficult problem of formulat
ing the content of the checks. It has been suggested that the information con
tained in the software safety analysis can be used .o guide the content and place
ment of run-time checks [50,78].
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Recovery routines are needed (from a safety standpoint) when an unsafe
state is detected externally, when it is determined that the software cannot pro
vide a required output within a prescribed time limit, or when continuation of a
regular routine would lead to a catastrophic system state if there is no interces
sion. Recovery techniques can, in general, be divided into two types — backward
and forward.
Backward recovery techniques basically involve returning the system to a
prior state (hopefully one that precedes the fault) and then going forward again
with an alternate piece of code. There is no attempt to diagnose the particular
fault that caused the error nor to assess the extent of any other damage the fault
may have caused [4]. Note the assumption that the alternate code will work
better than the original code. To try to ensure this, different algorithms may be
used (e.g., algorithms that were not chosen originally for efficiency or other rea
sons). There is, of course, still a possibility that the alternate algorithms also will
produce undesired results. This is especially likely if the error originated from
flawed specifications smd misunderstandings about the required operation of the
software.
Backward recovery is adequate if it can be guaranteed that software faults
will be detected and successful recovery completed before the faults affect the
external state. However, this usually cannot be guaranteed. Fault tolerance
facilities may fail or it may be determined that a correct output cannot be pro
duced within prescribed time limits. Control actions that depend upon the incre
mental state of the system such as torquing a gyro or a stepping motor cannot be
recovered by checkpoint and rollback [l2l]. A software error may not necessarily
be readily or immediately apparent. A small error may require hours to build up
to a value that exceeds a prescribed safety tolerance limit. And even if backward
application software recovery is attempted, it may be necessary to take some con
current action in parallel with the recovery procedures. For example, it may be
necessary to ensure containment of any possible radiation or chemical leakage
while attempting softwaire recovery. Therefore, forward recovery to repair any
damage or minimize hazards will be required [73].
Forward recovery includes techniques that attempt to repair the faulty state.
This may involve an internal state of the computer or the state of the controlled
process. Forward recovery techniques may return the system to a correct state
or, if that is not possible, contain or minimize the effects of the failure. Examples
of forward recovery techniques include using robust data structures [l26j,
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dynamically altering the flow of control, ignoring single cycle errors that will be
corrected on the next iteration, and changing to a reduced function or fail-safe
mode.
Most safety-critical systems are designed to have a safe-side, that is, a state
that is reachable from any other state and that is always safe. Often this safe
side has penalties from a performance standpoint; for example, the system may
be shut-down or switched to a subsystem that can provide fewer services.
Besides shutting down, it may be necessary to take some action to avoid harm,
such as blowing up a rocket in mid-air. Note that these types of safety systems
may themselves cause harm as in the example of the emergency destruct facility
that accidentally blew up 72 French weather ballc
In more complex designs, there may be intern iiate safe states with limited
functionality, especially in those systems for which a shutdown would be heizar-
dous itself. For example, a failure of a traffic light often results in the light being
switched to a state with the light blinking red in all directions. The X-29 is an
experimental, unstable aircraft that cannot be flown safely by human control
alone. If the digital computers fail, control is switched to an analog device that
provides less functionality than the digital computers but allows the plane to
land safely. The new U.S. Air Traffic Control system has a requirement to pro
vide for several levels of service including Full Service, Reduced Capability, and
Emergency Mode. Keeping a person in the loop is another simple design for a
' ^ckup system.
•
In general, the non-normal control modes for a process-control system might
•xlude:
• Partial Shutdown: the system has partial or degraded functionality
• Hold: no functionality is provided, but steps are taken to maintain safety or
to limit the amount of damage
• Emergency Shutdown: the system is shutdown completely
• Manual or Externally Controlled: the system continues to function, but con
trol is switched to a source external to the computer — the computer may
be responsible for a smooth transition
• Restart: the system is in a transitional state from non-normal to normal.
Reconfiguration or dynamically altering the flow of control is a form of par
tial shutdown. In real-time systems it is often the case that the criticality of
tasks may change during processing and may depend upon run-time
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environmental conditions. If peak system overload is increasing the response time
above some critical value, run-time reconfiguration of the system may be
achieved by delaying or temporarily eliminating non-critical functions. Note that
system overload may be caused or increased by internal conditions such as exces
sive attempts to perform backward recovery. Some aspects of deadline schedul
ing have been explored by Campbell, Horton, and Belford [20].
Higgs [52] describes the design of the software to control a turbine-generator.
This design provides an example of the use of several of the techniques described
above including a very simple hierarchy, self-test, and reduction of complexity.
The safety requirements for the system include the requirements that (1) the
governor should always be able to close the steam valves within a few hundred
milliseconds if overstressing or even catastrophic destruction of the turbine is to
be avoided, and (2) under no circumstances can the steam valves open spuriously,
whatever the nature of the internal or external fault.
The software is designed as a two-level structure with the top-level responsi
ble for the less important governing functions and for the supervisory, co
ordination, and management functions. Loss of the upper level cannot endanger
the turbine and does not cause the turbine to shutdown. The upper control level
uses conventional hardware and softwaje aind resides on a separate processor from
the base level software.
The bsuse level is a secure software core that can detect significant failures of
the hardware that surrounds it. It includes self-checks to decide whether incom
ing signab are sensible and whether the processor itself is functioning correctly.
A failure of a self-check leads to the output reverting to a safe state through the
action of fail-safe hardware. There are two potential software safety problems:
(1) the code responsible for self-checking, validating incoming and outgoing sig
nals, and for promoting the fail-safe shutdown must be effectively error-free, and
(2) spurious corruption of this vital code must not cause a dangerous condition or
allow a dormant fault to be manifested.
Base level software is held as firmware and written in assembler for speed.
No interrupts are used in this code other than the one, nonmaskable interrupt
used to stop the processor in event of a fatal store fault. The avoidance of inter
rupts means that the timing and sequencing of operation of the processor can be
defined for any particular state at any time. This allows the opportunity for
more rigorous and exhaustive testing. The avoidance of interrupts means that
polling must be used. A simple design in which all messages are unidirectional
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and there are no contention or r ecovery protocols required is also aimed at ensur
ing a higher level of predictability in the operation of the base software.
The organization of the base level functional tasks is under the control of a
comprehensive state table that, in addition to defining the scheduling of tasks,
also determines the various self-check criteria that are appropriate under paxticu-
lar conditions. The ability to accurately predict the scheduling of the processes
means that very precise timing criteria can be applied to the execution time of
certain sections of the most important code such as the self-check and watchdog
routines. Finally, the store is continuously checked for faults.
Some design techniques proposed for enhancing safety have been briefly
described in this section. There are many more that could be invented. Although
much has been written about how to design software, there needs to be a sorting
out of which techniques are actually the most effective for systems where safety is
important.
Human Factors Issues
As computers take over more and^ more monitoring and control functions in
systems where they are required to intleract with humans, software engineers will
need to consider human factors issues, especially with respect to software require-
menrspecifications. Several issues arise with regard to safety.
When designing a system that humans and computers will interact to con
trol, one of the basic problems is determining the allocation of tasks between the
human and computer. The goal is to optimize with respect to some criteria such
as maximizing speed of response, minimizing deviations of important variables,
maximizing availability, and maximizing safety. Again, it may not be possible to
achieve the optimum with respect to all desired variables because of conflicts, and
therefore tradeoffs must be considered.
One essential Ingredient in solving the task allocation problem is knowledge
of the ways in which multiple tasks may interact and subsequently degrade or
enhance the performance of the human or computer. Two or more tasks may be
complementary in that having responsibility for all of them leads to improved
performance on each because they provide important information about each
other. On the other hand, tasks can be mutually incompatible in that having
responsibility for all of them degrades performance on each of them [122].
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Rouse [l22j notes that there are two possible approaches to task allocation:
(1) partition the tasks into two subsets giving one to the computer and one to
the human; (2) dynamically allocate a particular task to the human or computer
controller that has at the moment the most resources available for performing the
task.
Air TrafTic Control (ATC) is an interesting and timely example of the
difficulty in solving the task-allocation problem. The long term plan of the FAA
is to increase automation of the controller function with a human role change
from controller of every aircraft to an ATC manager who handles exceptions
while the computer takes care of routine ATC commands. There has been some
concern voiced about this goal in Europe [136] and the U.S. [69]. The European
approach involves more of a partnership between the computer and the human
that, it is hoped, will be superior to either of them, working alone. Questions
have been raised in Europe as to whether the controller who has to intervene in
an exceptional case will be properly placed and able to do so. The lack of experi
ence in talking to aircraft individually over a long period of time may lead to
either mistakes in instructions or to a generally increasing reluctance to intervene
in the system at all [136].
There is little experimental evidence to support or negate these hypotheses,
but a study of an automated steel plant in the Netherlands [136] found serious
productivity problems resulting from the changed roles of the human operators.
The operators found that they did not know when to take over from the com
puter, and they became unsure of themselves. They were hampered from observ
ing the process by a lack of visual contact and had difficulty in assessing when
the computer was failing to control the operation effectively. The operators also
failed to fully understand the control programs used by the computer, and this
reinforced their attitude of "standing well back" from the operation except when
things were clearly going awry. Therefore, they tended to intervene too late.
A Rand report [142] has proposed a concept for Air Traffic Control called
shared control in which primary responsibility for traffic control would rest with
human controllers, but the automated system would assist them by continually
checking and monitoring their work zind proposing alternative plans. In high
traffic periods, the controllers could turn increztsing portions of the planning over
to the automated system. They could thus keep their own workloads relatively
constant. The most routine functions, requiring the least intellectual abilities,
such as monitoring plans for deviations from agreed flight paths, would be the
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only functions fully automated.
The question of whether the best results are achieved by automating the
human operator's tasks or by providing aids to help the operator perform it is not
yet solved. But the current trend is to have the human become more of a moni
tor and supervisor and less of a continuous controller. As this happens, one of his
or her primary responsibilities may be to detect system failures and diagnose
their source. One particularly important issue in the area of failure detection
concerns how the human's performance is affected by simultaneously having
other tajsks to do in addition to failure detection. Experimental data is
conflicting [34,122,123]. Rouse [122] suggests that it is reasonable to conjecture
that having to control while monitoring for failures is beneficial if performing the
control task provides cues that directly help to detect failures and if the work
load is low enough to allow the human to utilize the cues. Otherwise, controlling
simply increases the work load and decreeises the amount of attention that can be
devoted to failure detection.
The problem of human complacency and keeping the operator's attention
appeeirs to be a serious one. There is evidence that complacency and lack of
situational awareness has become a problem for pilots of aircraft with sophisti
cated computer controls [39,54,107,110,130]. For example, Perrow [110] reports
that a government study of thousands of near mishaps reported voluntarily by
aircraft crews and group support personnel concluded that the altitude alert sys
tem (an aural signal) had resulted in decreased altitude awareness by the flight
crews and recommende .at the device be disabled for all b ' a few long-
distajice flights. Ternhem [130] reports many examples of piivcs leaning on
automatic flight control systems to such a degree that m<my become lax in their
attention to the primary flight instructions or even revise their priorities. Com
placency and inattention appeared to cause them to react to failures and errors in
the automatic controls much slower than they should have. Experiments have
shown that the reliability of an operator taking over successfully when the
automated system fails increases as the operator's subjective probability of an
equipment failure increases [134]. Perrow [110] contends that when a pilot sud
denly and unexpectedly is brought into the control loop (i.e., must start partici
pating in decision msiking) as a result of equipment failure, he is disoriented;
long periods of passive monitoring make one unprepared to act in emergencies.
Another aspect of complacen- ' has been noted with regard to robots. For
example, Park [108] suggests that warning signals that a robot arm is moving
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should not be present continuously because humans quickly become insensitive to
constant stimuli. Humans also commonly make mistaken assumptions about
robot movements. For example, if the arm is not moving, they assume it is not
going to move; if the arm is repeating one pattern of motion, they assume it will
continue to repeat that pattern; if the ctrm is moving slowly, they assume it will
continue to move slowly; and if they tell the arm to move, they assume it will
move the way they want it to.
There axe other interesting issues with respect to safety and human factors.
One is selecting the amount, type, and structure of information presented to the
human under both normal and emergency conditions in order to optimize the
human's performance. Another is maintaining human confidence in the
automated system. For example, unless the pilot has confidence in ein aircraft
autolanding system, he is likely to disconnect it instead of allowing the landing to
be completed automatically [95j. Below certain altitudes, however, safe manual
goarounds cannot be assured when the system is disconnected. The autolanding
system, therefore, must consistently fly the aircraft in a marmer that the pilot
considers desirable. Data should also be provided to allow the pilot to monitor
the system progress and dynamic performance. When the pilot is able to observe
on the flight displays that the proper altitude corrections are being made by the
autopilot, then the pilot is more likely to leave it engaged even in the presence of
disturbances that cause large control actions.
A final issue is that of spurious shutdowns. While it is important that the
computer provide fail-safe facilities, evidence shows that if the rate of spurious
shutdowns or spurious warnings is too high, operators can be tempted to ignore
them or bridge up relevant devices to avoid them [21].
For many reasons, some of which involve liability and other issues that have
little to do with safety, operators have unfairly been blamed for mishaps that
really resulted from equipment failures. Some of the reasons for this are exam
ined by Perrow [110]. One result is that it has been suggested that humans be
removed from the loop. The current evidence appears to be that although
humans do make mistakes, computers also make mistakes, and removing humans
from the loop in favor of so-called expert systems or total computer control is
probably not desirable.
A mishap at the Crystal River nuclear reactor plant in February, 1980 [87]
provides jtist one example of an incident that would have been much more seri
ous if the operator had not intervened to counteract erroneous computer
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commands. For unknown reasons^ a short circuit occurred in some of the con
trols in the control room. The utility said that it ild have been due to a bent
connecting pin in the control panel or by some maintenance work being done on
an adjacent panel. The short circuit distorted some of the readings in the sys
tem, in particular the coolant temperature. The computer "thought" the coolant
was growing too cold, so it speeded up the reaction in the core. The reactor
overheated, the pressure in the core went up to the danger level, and then the
reactor automatically shut down. The computer correctly ordered the pressure
relief valve to open, but incorrectly ordered it to remain open until things settled
down. Pressure dropped so quickly, that it caused the automatic high pressure
injection to come on which flooded the primary coolant loop. A valve stuck and
43,000 gallons of radioactive water were dumped the ^.oor of th reactor build
ing. The operator noticed the computer's error i.. keepir.g the re.ief valve open
and closed the valve manually. Had the operator followed the dictum that the
computer is always right and hesitated to step in, the incident would have been
much more serious.
Considering the much repeated statement in this paper that mishaps often
result from unanticipated events and conditions, it is doubtful that computers
will be able to cope with emergencies as well as humans can. The emphasis
should be on providing the human operator with an operational environment and
appropriate information that will allow intervention in a timely and correct
manner. Since this involves software requirements and design, it is important
hat software engineers become mere familiar with human factors issues and that
quirement specification procedures and fault tolerance techniques consider
human/computer interaction.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to survey software safety in terms of why, what,
and how. A fair conclusion might be that "why" is well understood, "what" is
still subject to debate, and "how" is completely up in the air. There are no
software safety techniques that have been widely used and validated. Some tech
niques that are touted as useful for software safety are probably a waste of
resources. The best that builders of these types of systems can do 3 (l) to select
a suite of techniques and tools spanning the entire soft••are development process
that appear to be coherent a. useful and (2) to apply them in a conscientious
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and thorough manner. Dependence on any one approach is unwise at this stage
of knowledge.
Although this paper has focused on the technological aspects of the problem,
there are also larger, social issues that must be considered by us as humans who
also happen to be technologists. Perrow and others [14, 110] have asked whether
these systems should be built at all- He suggests partitioning high-risk systems
into three categories. The first are those systems with either low catastrophic
potential or high-cost alternatives. Examples include chemical plants, aircraft,
air traffic control, dams, mining, fossil fuel power plants, highways, and automo
biles. These systems are self-correcting to some degree and could be further
improved with quite modest efforts. Systems in this category can be tolerated,
but should be improved. The second category includes those technologies with
moderate catastrophic potential and moderate-cost alternatives. These are sys
tems that could be made less risky with considerable effort and that we are either
unlikely to be able to do without (e.g., marine transport) or where the expected
benefits are so substantial that some risks should be run (e.g., recombinant
DNA). The final category includes systems with high catastrophic potential dJid
relatively low-cost alternatives. He argues that systems in this final category
should be abandoned and replaced because the inevitable risks outweigh any rea
sonable benefits. He places nuclear weapons and nuclear power in this group.
This is just one view, but addresses a question that needs to be raised and con
sidered by us all.
Another issue is that of regulation and the government's right to regulate.
Does the government have the right to impose a small involuntary cost on mzmy
or most of its citizens (in the form of a tax or higher prices) to make a few or
even most people a little safer [96,97]? Alternative forms of regulation include
tort law, insurance, and voluntary standard-setting organizations. The decision
to rely on any of these forms of regulation involves ethical and political issues
upon which not everybody would agree.
Morgan [96,97] argues that managing risk involves using resources that
might otherwise be devoted to advancing science and technology, improving pro
ductivity, or enriching culture. If we become overly concerned about risk, we are
likely to build a society that is stagnant and has very little freedom. Yet no rea
sonable person would argue that society should forget about risk. There is a need
for a continual balancing act.
- 49-
It is apparent tha* there are more questions than answe. A^ith regard to
software safety. Many .iportant research problems are waiting for creative and
innovative ideas. Just as the developing missile and space programs of the 1950's
and 1960's forced the development of system safety, it has been suggested that
because of the increasing use of computers in safety-critical systems, we must
force the development of software safety before major disasters occur (13].
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Appendix A — Hazard Categorization Examples
Hcizard severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure of
the worse potential consequences resulting from personnel error, environmental
conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies, system, subsystem, or
component failure, or malfunction. Some examples follow:
MIL-STD-882B: System Safety Program Requirements:
category I - Catastrophic; may cause death or system loss
category II - Critical; may cause severe injury, several occupational illness,
or major system damage.
category III - Marginal; may cause minor injury, minor occupational illness,
or minor system deunage.
category IV - Negligible; will not result in injury, occupational illness, or sys
tem damage.
NHB 5300.4 (l.D.l) a NASA document:
Category 1 - loss of life or vehicle (includes loss or injury to public)
Category 2 - loss of mission (includes both post-launch abort and launch
delay sufficient to cause mission scrub)
Category 3 - all others.
DOE 5481.1 (Nuclear)
low - those hazards that present minor onsite and negligible offsite impacts
to people or the environment
moderate - those that present considerable potential onsite impacts to people
or environment, but at most only minor offsite impacts
high - those with potential for major onsite or offsite impacts to people or
the environment.
Appendix B — Hazard Analysis
There are many different types of hazard analysis that are used and multiple
techniques for accomplishing them. The following is a brief description of some
typical types of hazard analysis. More information can be found in system safety
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textbooks [e.g., 87,117].
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA): FHA involves an initial risk assess
ment. The purpose is to identify safety critical areas and functions, identify and
evaluate hazards, and identify the safety design criteria to be used. It is started
early during the concept exploration phase or the earliest life cycle phases of the
progreun so that safety considerations are included in tradeoff studies and design
alternatives. The results may be used in developing system safety requirements
and in preparing performance and design specifications.
Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA): SSHA is started as soon as the subsys
tems are designed in sufficient detail, and it is updated as the design matures.
Design changes are also evaluated to determine whether the safety of system is
affected. The purpose of SSHA is to identify hazards associated with the design
of the subsystems including component failure modes, critical human error
inputs, and hazards resulting from functional relationships between the com
ponents and equipment comprising each subsystem. This analysis looks at each
subsystem or component and identifies hazards associated with operating or
failure modes including performance, performance degradation, functional failure,
or inadvertent functioning. SSHA is especially intended to determine how failure
of components affects overall safety of the system. It includes identifying neces
sary actions to determine how to eliminate or reduce the risk of identified hazairds
and also evaluates design response to the safety requirements of the subsystem
specification.
System Hazard Analysis (SHA): SHA begins as the design matures —
around preliminary design review — and continues as the design is updated until
it is complete. Design chctnges need to be evaluated also. SHA involves detailed
studies of possible hazards created by interfaces between subsystems or by the
system operating as a whole including potential safety-critical human errors.
Specifically, SHA examines all subsystem interfaces for (a) compliance with safety
criteria in system requirements specifications, (b) possible combinations of
independent, dependent, and simultaneous hazardous events or failures, including
failures of controls and safety devices, that could cause hazards, (c) degradation
of the safety of the system from the normal operation of the systems and subsys
tems. The purpose is to recommend changes and controls and to evaluate design
responses to safety requirements. It is accomplished in same way as SSHA.
However, SSHA examines how component operation or failure affects the system
while SHA determines how system operation and failure modes can affect the
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safety of the system and its subsystems.
Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (OSHA): OSHA identifies hazards
and risk reduction procedures during all phases of system use and maintenance.
It especially examines hazards created by the man-machine interface.
Several techniques are used to perform these analyses. These include:
• Design reviews and walkthroughs
• Checklists
• Fault Tree Analysis - Construction of a logic diagram containing credible
event sequences, mechanical and humam, that could lead to a specified
hazcurd. Probabilities can be assigned to each event, and thus an overall pro
bability for the hazeird can be calculated [135].
• Event Tree Analysis (or Incident Sequence Analysis): Traces a primary
event forward in order to define its consequences. Differs from a Fault Tree
in that the fault tree traces an undesired event back to its causes. The two
trees together comprise a cause-consequence diagram.
• Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOF): a qualitative procedure that
involves a systematic search for heizards by generating questions considering
the effects of deviations in normal parameters.
• Random Number Simulation Antdysis (RNSA): Uses a fault tree or similar
logical model as basis for the analysis. However, instead of expressing the
probability of each individual contributing failure event as a single number,
it is expressed as a range of probabilities over which the failure event can
occur. Results in a probability distribution curve of the hazsurd instead of a
single numerical value.
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): Basically a reliability tech
nique sometimes used in safety studies. Examines the effects of all failure
modes of the system or subsystems. Advantages of FMEA are that it can be
used without first identifying the possible mishaps and can therefore help in
revealing unforeseen hazards, but very time consuming and expensive since
all failures including non-hazardous failures are considered. Good at identi
fying potentially hazardous single failures, but normally does not consider
multiple failures. Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
extends FMEA by categorizing each component failure according to the
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seriousness of its effect and its probability and frequency of occurrence.
